Arrow's Impossibility Theorem: Two Simple Single-Profile Versions

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Abstract

In this short paper we provide two simple new versions of Arrow's impossibility theorem, in a world with only one preference profile. Both versions are extremely transparent. The first version assumes a two-agent society; the second version, which is similar to a theorem of Pollak, assumes two or more agents. Both of our theorems rely on diversity of preferences axioms, and we explore alternative notions of diversity at length. Our first theorem also uses a neutrality assumption, commonly used in the literature; our second theorem uses a neutrality/monotonicity assumption, which is stronger and less commonly used. We provide examples to show the logical independence of the axioms, and to illustrate our points.

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1. Introduction.

In 1950 Kenneth Arrow (1950, 1963) provided a striking answer to a basic abstract problem of democracy: how can the preferences of many individuals be aggregated into social preferences? The answer, which has come to be known as Arrow's impossibility theorem, was that every conceivable aggregation method has some flaw. That is, a handful of reasonable-looking axioms, which one hopes an aggregation procedure would satisfy, lead to impossibility: the axioms are mutually inconsistent. The impossibility theorem created a large literature and major field called social choice theory; see for example, Suzumura's (2002) Introduction to the *Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare*, and the Campbell and Kelly (2002) survey in the same volume. The theorem has also had a major influence on the larger fields of economics and political science, as well as on distant fields like mathematical biology. (See, e.g., Bay and McMorris (2003).)

In this paper we shall develop two versions of Arrow's impossibility theorem. Our models are so-called single-profile models. This means impossibility is established in the context of one fixed profile of preferences, rather than in the (standard) Arrow context of many varying preference profiles. Single-profile Arrow theorems were first proved in the late 1970's by Parks (1976), Hammond (1976), Kemp and Ng (1976), Pollak (1979), and Roberts (1980). Rubinstein (1984) used mathematical logic to see whether or not there are single-profile versions of every multi-profile theorem of social choice.

Single-profile theorems were devised in response to an argument of Paul Samuelson (1967) against Arrow. Samuelson claimed that Arrow's model, with varying

preference profiles, is irrelevant to the problem of maximizing a Bergson-Samuelson-type social welfare function (Bergson (1938)), which depends on a given set of ordinal utility functions, that is, a fixed preference profile. The single-profile Arrow theorems established that bad results (dictatorship, or illogic of social preferences, or, more generally, impossibility of aggregation) could be proved with one fixed preference profile (or set of ordinal utility functions), provided the profile is "diverse" enough.

This paper has two purposes. The first is to provide two short and transparent single-profile Arrow theorems. In addition to being short and simple, our theorems, unlike previous single-profile Arrow theorems, do not require the existence of large numbers of alternatives. Our second purpose is to explore the meaning of preference profile diversity. Our first Arrow impossibility theorem assumes that there are only two people, and is extremely easy to prove. The proof relies on a neutrality assumption and our first version of preference diversity, which we call diversity-1. We argue that, in single-profile models, neutrality is the natural assumption to substitute for Arrow's independence of irrelevant alternatives assumption. In our second version of Arrow's impossibility theorem, which is close to Pollak's, there are two or more people. We strengthen neutrality to neutrality/monotonicity, as was done by Pollak and others. We use a much weaker preference diversity assumption, diversity-2, than was used by other authors. This is the main innovation of our second theorem. Although the diversity-2 assumption has the drawback that it requires some information about the social preference relation in order to be well defined, it has the great advantage is that it is "almost necessary" for the impossibility result. In fact we offer a near-converse to the impossibility result: if there is a dictator, the preference profile must satisfy diversity-2.

Fleurbaey and Mongin (2005) argue for returning to the Bergson-Samuelson social welfare function framework, and in the process are critical of neutrality. While we concede that the neutrality condition may sometimes be problematic, we feel it is more often reasonable, and we argue for its appropriateness below. We also point out that the existence of Arrow-type dictators may be less objectionable in a single-profile world than in multi-profile worlds, although if preferences are diverse enough dictators remain undesirable. We discuss alternative preference diversity assumptions at length, and we clarify the relationship between diversity and dictatorship for single-profile Arrow theorems.

Other recent related literature includes Geanakoplos (2005), who has three very elegant proofs of Arrow's theorem in the standard multi-profile context, and Ubeda (2004) who has another elegant multi-profile proof. These proofs, while short, are mathematically more challenging than ours. Ubeda also emphasizes the importance of (multi-profile) neutrality, similar to but stronger than the assumption we use in this paper, and much stronger than Arrow's independence, and he provides several theorems establishing neutrality's equivalence to other intuitively appealing principles. Reny (2001) has an interesting side-by-side pair of (multi-profile) proofs, of Arrow's theorem and the related theorem of Gibbard and Satterthwaite.

2. The Model.

We assume a society with $n \geq 2$ individuals, and 3 or more alternatives. A specification of the preferences of all individuals is called a preference profile. In our theorems there is only one preference profile. The preference profile is transformed into

a social preference relation. Both the individual and the social preference relations allow indifference. The individual preference relations are all assumed to be complete and transitive. The following notation is used: Generic alternatives are *x, y, z, w*, etc. Particular alternatives are *a, b, c, d*, etc. A generic person is labeled *i*, *j*, *k* and so on; a particular person is 1, 2, 3, and so on. Person *i*'s preference relation is R_i. xR_iy means person *i* prefers *x* to *y* or is indifferent between them; xP_iy means *i* prefers *x* to *y*; xI_iy means *i* is indifferent between them. Society's preference relation is *R*. *xRy* means society prefers *x* to *y* or is indifferent between them; *xPy* means society prefers *x* to *y*; *xIy* means society is indifferent between them. We will start with the following assumptions:

(1) **Complete and transitive social preferences**. The social preference relation *R* is complete and transitive.

(2.a) **Weak Pareto principle**. For all *x* and *y*, if xP_iy for all *i*, then *xPy*.

(2.b) **Strong Pareto principle**. For all *x* and *y*, if xR_iy for all *i*, and xP_iy for some *i*, then *xPy*.

(3.a) **Neutrality**. Suppose individual preferences for *w* vs. *z* are identical to individual preferences for *x* vs. *y*. Then the social preference for *w* vs. *z* must be identical to the social preference for *x* vs. *y*. More formally: For all *x*, *y*, *z*, and *w*, assume that, for all *i*, xP_iy if and only if wP_iz, and zP_iw if and only if yP_ix. Then *wRz* if and only if *xRy*, and *zRw* if and only if *yRx*.

(4) **No dictator**. There is no dictator. Individual *i* is a *dictator* if, for all *x* and *y*, xP_iy implies *xPy*.

(5.a) **Diverse-1 preferences**. There exists a triple of alternatives *x*, *y*, *z*, such that xP_iy for all *i*, but opinions are split on *x* vs. *z*, and on *y* vs. *z*. That is, some people prefer *x* to *z* and some people prefer *z* to *x*, and, similarly, some people prefer *y* to *z* and some people prefer *z* to *y*.

Note that we have two alternative versions of the Pareto principle here. The first (weak Pareto) is more common in the Arrow's theorem literature (e.g., see Campbell and Kelly (2002), p. 42). We will use the strong Pareto principle in our $n = 2$ impossibility theorem below, and the weak Pareto principle in our $n \geq 2$ impossibility theorem. Neutrality, assumption 3.a, and diverse-1 preferences, assumption 5.a, are so numbered because we will introduce alternatives later.

Also note that the no dictator assumption is slightly different in the single-profile world from what it is in the multi-profile world. For example, in the single-profile world, if all individuals have the same preferences, and if Pareto holds (weak or strong), then by definition everyone is a dictator. Or, if individual *i* is indifferent among all the alternatives, he is by definition a dictator. We will discuss this possibility of innocuous dictatorship in section 9 below. For now, we simply observe that if preferences between individuals are diverse enough, and indifference is limited enough, dictatorship remains extremely objectionable, even in a single-profile world.

3. Some Examples in a 2-Person Model.

We will illustrate with a few simple examples. For these there are 2 people and 3 alternatives, and we assume no individual indifference between any pair of alternatives.

Given that we aren't allowing individual indifference, the two Pareto principles collapse into one. Preferences of the 2 people are shown by listing the alternatives from top (most preferred) to bottom (least preferred). In our examples, the last column of the table shows what is being assumed about society's preferences. The comment below each example indicates which desired property is breaking down. The point of these examples is that if we are willing to discard any 1 of our 5 basic assumptions, the remaining 4 may be mutually consistent.

Example 1

Person 1	Person 2	Society (Majority Rule)
a	*c*	
b	*a*	*aPb, aIc & bIc*
c	*b*	

Breakdown: Transitivity for social preferences fails. Transitivity for *R* implies transitivity for *I*. This means *aIc & cIb* should imply *aIb*. But we have *aPb.*

Example 2

Person 1	Person 2	Society
a	*c*	
b	*a*	*aIbIc*
c	*b*	

Breakdown: Pareto (weak or strong) fails, because aP_1b & aP_2b should imply *aPb*. But we have *aIb*.

Example 3

Person 1	Person 2	Society
a	*c*	*a*
b	*a*	*c*
c	*b*	*b*

Breakdown: Neutrality fails. Compare the social treatment of *a* vs. *c*, where the two people are split and person 1 gets his way, to the social treatment of *b* vs. *c*, where the two people are split and person 2 gets his way.

	Person 1	Person 2	Society (1 is Dictator)
Example 4	*a*	*c*	*a*
	b	*a*	*b*
	c	*b*	*c*

Breakdown: There is a dictator.

Note that examples 1 through 4 all use the same profile of individual preferences, which satisfies the diverse-1 preferences assumption. The next example modifies the individual preferences:

	Person 1	Person 2	Society (Majority Rule)
Example 5	*a*	*c*	
	c	*a*	*aIc*
	b	*b*	*aPb* & *cPb*

Breakdown: Diverse-1 preferences fails. Opinions are no longer split over two pairs of alternatives.

4. Neutrality, Independence, and Some Preliminary Arrow Paradoxes.

One of the most controversial of Arrow's original assumptions was independence of irrelevant alternatives. We did not define it above because it does not play a direct role in single-profile Arrow theorems; however it lurks behind the scenes. Therefore we define it at this point. Arrow's independence requires the existence of multiple preference profiles, and to accommodate multiple profiles, we will use primes: Person *i*'s preference relation was shown as R_i above, and society's as R; at this point we will write

R_i' and R' for *alternative* preferences for person *i* and society, respectively. Arrow's independence of irrelevant alternatives condition is as follows:

> (6) **Independence**. Let $R_1, R_2, ...$ and R be one set of individual and social preference relations and $R_1', R_2', ...$ and R' be another. Let *x* and *y* be any pair of alternatives such that the unprimed individual preferences for *x* vs. *y* are identical to the primed individual preferences for *x* vs. *y*. Then the unprimed social preference for *x* vs. *y* must be identical to the primed social preference for *x* vs. *y*.

Note the parallel between the independence assumption and the neutrality assumption. Independence requires multiple preference profiles whereas our version of neutrality assumes there is one preference profile. Independence focuses on a pair of alternatives and switches between two preference profiles, one unprimed and the other primed. It says that if the *x* vs. *y* individual preferences are the same under the two preference profiles, then the *x* vs. *y* unprimed social preference must be the same as the *x* vs. *y* primed social preference. This statement is of course vacuous if there is only one preference profile. The closest analogy when there is only one preference profile is neutrality, which says that if individual preferences regarding *x* vs. *y* under the one fixed preference profile are the same as individual preferences regarding *w* vs. *z* under that profile, then the *x* vs. *y* social preference must be the same as the *w* vs. *z* social preference.

In short, in a single-profile model, independence is a vacuous assumption, and its natural substitute is neutrality.

This natural substitution, however, prompted Samuelson (1977) to launch a colorful attack (specifically directed at the Kemp's and Ng's (1976) neutrality assumption). Samuelson (1977) called neutrality, among other things, "anything but 'reasonable'," "gratuitous," having a "spurious appearance of reasonableness," "abhorrent from an ethical viewpoint," "monstrously 'unreasonable'," and so on. He offered the following *reductio ad absurdum* example:


> **Samuelson's Chocolates.** There are two people. There is a box of 100 chocolates to be distributed between them. They both like chocolates, and each is hungry enough to eat them all. The alternatives are, say, $x_0 = (100, 0)$, $x_1 = (99,1)$, $x_2 = (98, 2)$, etc., where the first number is the number of chocolates going to person 1, and the second is the number going to person 2.
>
> Many ethical observers, looking at this society, would say that x_1 is better than x_0. That is, $x_1 P x_0$. That is, it would be good thing to take a chocolate from person 1, when he has 100 of them, and give it to person 2.
>
> But now, by repeated applications of neutrality, $x_{100} P x_k$ for any $k < 100$! That is, society should give all of the chocolates to person 2!

The Samuelson's chocolates example is an interesting attack on neutrality, but should not be viewed as a compelling reason to drop it. One response to the example is to say society should not decide that x_1 is better than x_0 in the first place; if society simply found x_0 and x_1 equally good (contrary to the instincts of the chocolate

redistributionist), neutrality would have implied that all the *x*'s are socially indifferent. This would have been perfectly logical. Another response is to observe that neutrality is a property of very important and widely used decision-making procedures, such as majority voting, and therefore should not be lightly dismissed. In fact, any social decision procedure that simply counts instances of xP_iy, yP_ix, xI_iy, but does not weigh strength of feelings, satisfies neutrality. Ubeda (2004) discusses the connection between (multi-preference profile) neutrality and other important properties of social preference aggregation procedures.

Samuelson (1977) also offered a graphical argument against Arrow's theorem with neutrality, an argument that was simplified and improved years later by Fleurbaey and Mongin (2005). The latter agree with Samuelson that neutrality is excessively strong, and present the following to establish that neutrality plus Pareto implies dictatorship:

> **Fleurbaey and Mongin Graphical Arrow Impossibility Argument.** Assume there are two people, and some set of alternatives x, y, z and so on. Assume the individuals have utility functions u_1 and u_2, so $u_1(x)$, for example, represents person 1's utility level from alternative *x*.
>
> Consider the following graph:



Utility levels of individuals 1 and 2 are on the horizontal and vertical axes, respectively. Each alternative shows up in the graph as a utility pair, for instance $u(z) = (u_1(z), u_2(z))$ represents alternative z. We start at $u(z)$ and draw horizontal and vertical lines through it, creating 4 quadrants.

Now assume complete and transitive social preferences, strong Pareto and neutrality. Take two alternatives, say x and y, whose utility vectors are within the south-east quadrant. Choose them so that $u(x)$ is northeast of $u(y)$.

Society cannot be indifferent between z and x for the following reasons: First, by neutrality, if society were indifferent between z and x, it would also have to be indifferent between z and y. Second, if it were indifferent between z and x, and between z and y, by transitivity it would have to be indifferent between x and y. But third, since $u(x)$ is northeast of $u(y)$, society must prefer x to y by Pareto.

Therefore society prefers z to x, or society prefers x to z. Suppose the social preference is x over z. Consider another alternative w. By neutrality, if $u(w)$ is in the northwest quadrant, society must prefer z to w. By strong Pareto, if $u(w)$ is in the northeast quadrant, society must prefer w to z. By strong Pareto, if $u(w)$ is in the southwest quadrant, society must prefer z to w. But this argument establishes that social preferences are always the same as person 1's; that is, person 1 is a dictator. Had we started out by assuming the social preference is z over x, person 2 would have been the dictator.

We make two observations about the Fleurbaey/Mongin graphical impossibility argument. First, it has the significant disadvantage that it requires the use of the utility functions u_1 and u_2, and it is cleaner to dispense with utility functions and simply use preference relations for individuals. Second, it incorporates a crucial diversity assumption without being explicit about it. Assuming the existence of the triple of utility vectors $u(x)$, $u(y)$, and $u(z)$, with their respective locations in the utility diagram, is in fact exactly the assumption of diverse-1 preferences: both 1 and 2 prefer x to y, but opinions are split on *x* vs. *z* and opinions are split on *y* vs. *z*. In our Arrow impossibility theorem 1 below we make this assumption explicit.

5. Arrow Impossibility Theorem 1, *n* = 2.

We are ready to turn to our own simple version of Arrow's impossibility theorem, in the single-profile model. Throughout this section, we assume *n* = 2. We will show

that our 5 assumptions, complete and transitive social preferences, strong Pareto, neutrality, diverse-1 preferences, and no dictator, are mutually inconsistent.

First we establish proposition 1, which is by itself a strong result. This proposition corresponds to Samuelson's chocolates example, and so we call it Samuelson's chocolates proposition 1. Then we prove our first simple version of Arrow's theorem[1].

Samuelson's Chocolates Proposition 1: Assume $n = 2$. Assume the strong Pareto principle, and neutrality. Suppose for some pair of alternatives x and y, xP_iy and yP_jx. Suppose that xPy. Then person i is a dictator.

Proof: Let w and z be any pair of alternatives. Assume wP_iz. We need to show that wPz must hold. If wR_jz, then wPz by strong Pareto. If not wR_jz, then zP_jw by completeness for j's preference relation, and then wPz by neutrality. QED.

Arrow Impossibility Theorem 1: Assume $n = 2$. The assumptions of complete and transitive social preferences, strong Pareto, neutrality, diverse-1 preferences, and no dictator are mutually inconsistent.

Proof: By diverse-1 preferences there exist x, y and z such that xP_iy for $i = 1, 2$, but such that opinions are split on x vs. z, and on y vs. z.

Now xPy by the Pareto principle, weak or strong. Since opinions are split on x vs. z, one person prefers x to z, while the other prefers z to x. If xPz, then the

[1] In our theorem we are using strong Pareto and neutrality to get impossibility. With an almost identical proof we could substitute weak Pareto and neutrality/monotonicity, where neutrality/monotonicity is a strengthened version of neutrality, to be discussed below.

person who prefers *x* to *z* is a dictator, by proposition 1. If *zPx*, then the person who prefers *z* to *x* is a dictator, by proposition 1.

Suppose then that *xIz*. Then *zIx*. By transitivity, *zIx* and *xPy* implies *zPy*. But opinions are split on *y* vs. *z*. Therefore one person prefers *z* to *y*, and the other person prefers *y* to *z*. By proposition 1, the person who prefers *z* to *y* is a dictator. We have shown that whatever the social preference for *x* and *z* might be, there must be a dictator. QED.

6. Trying to Generalize to an *n*-Person Model.

In what follows we will seek to generalize our version of Arrow's theorem to societies with arbitrary numbers of people. From this point on in the paper we will assume $n \geq 2$. In order to get an impossibility theorem when $n \geq 2$, we will need to strengthen some of our basic assumptions. We start with the neutrality assumption. We will strengthen it to a single-profile version of what is called neutrality/monotonicity. (See Blau & Deb (1977), who call the multi-profile analog "full neutrality and monotonicity"; Sen (1977), who calls it NIM; and Pollak (1979), who calls it "nonnegative responsiveness.")

(3.b) **Neutrality/monotonicity**. Suppose the support for *w* over *z* is as strong or stronger than the support for *x* over *y*, and suppose the opposite support, for *z* over *w*, is as weak or weaker than the support for *y* over *x*. Then, if the social preference is for *x* over *y*, the social preference must also be for *w* over *z*. More

formally: For all x, y, z, and w, assume that for all i, xP_iy implies wP_iz, and that for all i, zP_iw implies yP_ix. Then xPy implies wPz.

Does this strengthening of the neutrality assumption, by itself, give us an Arrow impossibility theorem when $n \geq 2$? The answer is No. In example 6 below there are 3 people and 4 alternatives, *a*, *b*, *c* and *d.* The preferences of individuals 1, 2 and 3 are shown in the first 3 columns of the table. The fourth column shows social preferences under majority rule, which is used here, as in examples 1 and 5, to generate the social preference relation.

	Person 1	Person 2	Person 3	Society (Majority Rule)
Example 6	*a*	*c*	*a*	*a*
	b	*a*	*c*	*c*
	c	*b*	*d*	*b*
	d	*d*	*b*	*d*

Breakdown: None. The complete and transitive social preferences assumption is satisfied, as are Pareto, neutrality/monotonicity, diverse-1 preferences, and no dictator. Majority rule works fine. There is no Arrow impossibility.

Example 6 shows that when $n \geq 2$ there is no Arrow impossibility, under the assumptions of complete and transitive social preferences, Pareto, neutrality/monotonicity, diverse-1 preferences, and no dictator.

7. Diversity.

In this section we will modify the diverse preferences assumption.

Before doing so, let's revisit the assumption in the $n = 2$ world. In that world, diverse-1 preferences says there must exist a triple of alternatives x, y, z, such that xP_iy for $i = 1, 2$, but such that opinions are split on x vs. z and on y vs. z. That is, one person prefers x to z, while the other prefers z to x, and one person prefers y to z, while the other prefers z to y. Given our assumption that individual preferences are transitive, it must be the case that the two people's preferences over the triple can be represented as follows:

Diverse-1 preferences array, $n = 2$.

Person *i*	Person *j*
x	*z*
y	*x*
z	*y*

Note that this is exactly the preference profile pattern of examples 1, 2, 3 and 4. The reader familiar with social choice theory may recognize the preferences in this table as being two thirds of the Condorcet voting paradox preferences, as shown below:

Condorcet voting paradox array.

Person *i*	Person *j*	Person *k*
x	*z*	*y*
y	*x*	*z*
z	*y*	*x*

A similar array of preferences is used by Arrow in the proof of his impossibility theorem (e.g. Arrow (1963), p. 58), and by many others since, including us (Feldman & Serrano (2006), p. 294). For the moment, assume V is any non-empty set of people in society, that V^C is the complement of V, and that V is partitioned into two non-empty

subsets V_1 and V_2. (Note that V^C may be empty.) The standard preference array used in many versions of Arrow's theorem looks like this:

Standard Arrow array.

People in V_1	People in V_2	People in V^C
x	z	y
y	x	z
z	y	x

Now, let's return to the question of how to modify the diverse preferences assumption. Example 6 shows that we cannot stick with the diverse-1 preferences array and still get an impossibility result. We might start with the Condorcet voting paradox array, but if $n \geq 4$, we would have to worry about the preferences of people other than *i*, *j* and *k*. That suggests using something like the standard Arrow array. However, assuming the existence of a triple *x, y,* and *z,* and preferences as per that array, for *every subset of people V and every partition of V*, is an unnecessarily strong diversity assumption.

An even stronger diversity assumption was in fact used by Parks (1976), Pollak and other originators of single-profile Arrow theorems. Pollak (1979) is clearest in his definition. His condition of "unrestricted domain over triples" requires the following: Imagine "any logically possible sub-profile" of individual preferences over 3 "hypothetical" alternatives *x, y* and *z*. Then there exist 3 actual alternatives *a, b* and *c* for which the sub-profile of preferences exactly matches that "logically possible sub-profile" over *x, y* and *z*. We will call this *Pollak diversity*. Let us consider what this assumption requires in the simple world of strict preferences, 2 people, and 3 alternatives. Pollak

diversity would require that every one of the following arrays be represented, somewhere in the actual preference profile of the two people over the actual alternatives:

Pollak diversity arrays, *n* = 2.

1	2	1	2	1	2	1	2	1	2	1	2
x	*x*	*x*	*x*	*x*	*y*	*x*	*y*	*x*	*z*	*x*	*z*
y	*y*	*y*	*z*	*y*	*x*	*y*	*z*	*y*	*x*	*y*	*y*
z	*z*	*z*	*y*	*z*	*z*	*z*	*x*	*z*	*y*	*z*	*x*

Note that the number of arrays in the table above is 3! = 6. If *n* were equal to 3 we would have triples of columns instead of pairs, and there would have to be $(3!)^2 = 36$ such triples. With *n* people, the number of required *n*-tuples would be $(3!)^{n-1}$. In short, the number of arrays required for Pollak diversity rises exponentially with *n*. The number of alternatives rises with the number of required arrays, although not as fast because of array overlaps. Parks (1976) uses an assumption ("diversity in society") that is very similar to Pollak's, although not so clear, and he indicates that it "requires at least 3^n alternatives..."

We believe Pollak diversity is much stronger than necessary, and we will proceed as follows. We will not assume the existence of a triple *x*, *y* and *z* to give every conceivable array of preferences on that triple. We will not even assume a triple *x*, *y* and *z* to give every possible array for given *V*, V_1, V_2, and V^C, as per the description of the standard Arrow array. We will only assume the existence of the required Arrow-type triple, and we will only assume that much when the Arrow array matters. For the purposes of our proof, the Arrow array assumption only matters if *V* is a decisive set of minimal size, and if it has 2 or more members.

We say that a set of people V is *decisive* if it is non-empty and if, for all alternatives x and y, if xP_iy for all i in V, then xPy. V is a *minimally sized* decisive set if there is no decisive set of smaller cardinality.

It is appropriate to make a few comments about the notion of decisiveness. First, note that if person i is a dictator, then i by himself is a minimally sized decisive set, although without 2 or more members, and any set strictly containing i is also decisive, but not minimally sized. Also, note that the Pareto principle (weak or strong) implies the set of all people is decisive. Second, in a multi-preference profile world, decisiveness for V would be a far stronger assumption that it is in the single-profile world, since it would require that (the same) V prevail no matter how preferences might change. We only require that V prevail under the given fixed preference profile.

Our diversity assumption is now modified as follows:

(5.b) **Diverse-2 preferences**. For any minimally-sized decisive set V with 2 or more members, there exists a triple of alternatives x, y, z, such that xP_iy for all i in V; such that yP_iz and zP_ix for everyone outside of V; and such that V can be partitioned into non-empty subsets V_1 and V_2, where the members of V_1 all put z last in their rankings over the triple, and the members of V_2 all put z first in their rankings over the triple.

The assumption of diverse-2 preferences means that for any minimally-sized decisive set V with 2 or more members, there is a triple x, y, and z, and a partition of V, which produces exactly the standard Arrow array shown above. A disadvantage of this

particular definition is that one must know what sets of individuals are decisive, before one can say whether preferences are diverse, and to know what sets of individuals are decisive one has to know the social preference relation, or the rule that produces it. Nonetheless, it is a logical definition. An important advantage of this definition is that is just strong enough to get the desired impossibility result.

Referring back to example 6 of the previous section, consider persons 2 and 3. Under simple majority rule, which was assumed in the example, they constitute a decisive coalition. They are a coalition of 2 or more members. They are a minimally-sized decisive coalition, because there is no dictator. However the diverse-2 preferences assumption *fails* in that example, because there is no way to define the triple *x*, *y*, *z* so as to get the standard Arrow array, when $V_1 = \{2\}$, $V_2 = \{3\}$, and $V^C = \{1\}$. Therefore diverse-2 preferences rules out example 6.

Example 7 below modifies example 6 to make it consistent with diverse-2 preferences. (This example is created from example 6 by switching alternatives *a* and *b* in person 3's ranking.) Now that preferences have been modified to satisfy our new diversity assumption, an Arrow-type impossibility pops up.

	Person 1	Person 2	Person 3	Society (Majority Rule)
Example 7	*a*	*c*	*b*	
	b	*a*	*c*	*aPb, bPc, cPa*
	c	*b*	*d*	*aPd, bPd, cPd*
	d	*d*	*a*	

Breakdown: Transitivity for social preferences fails, with a *P* cycle among *a,b,c* .

Example 7 could be further modified by dropping alternative *d*, in which case it would become the Condorcet voting paradox array. It would then have 3 people and 3 alternatives, and would satisfy diverse-2 preferences. Recall that Pollack diversity in the 3 person case would require at least 36 n-tuples of alternatives, and that Parks diversity would require at least $3^n = 27$ alternatives. The point here is that that diverse-2 preferences is a much less demanding assumption, and requires many fewer alternatives, than Pollack diversity.

We now make 3 simple observations about the assumptions of diverse-1 preferences, diverse-2 preferences, and Pollak diversity. (For the sake of brevity we omit the obvious proofs.)

Observation 1: Assume $n = 2$. Then diverse-1 preferences implies diverse-2 preferences.

Observation 2: Assume $n = 2$. Assume the weak Pareto principle. Then diverse-2 preferences implies diverse-1 preferences.

Observation 3: Assume $n \geq 2$. Pollak diversity implies diverse-1 preferences and diverse-2 preferences.

8. Arrow/Pollak Impossibility Theorem 2, $n \geq 2$.

We now proceed to a proof of our second single-profile Arrow's theorem, which, unlike our first proof, is not restricted to a 2-person society.[2] Although Pollak made a much stronger diversity assumption than we use, and although Parks (1976), Hammond

[2] We have a similar proof for a multi-profile Arrow's theorem in Feldman & Serrano (2006).

(1976), and Kemp and Ng (1976), preceded Pollak with single-profile Arrow theorems, we will call this the Arrow/*Pollak* Impossibility Theorem, because of the similarity of our proof to his. But first, we need a proposition paralleling proposition 1:

Proposition 2: Assume $n \geq 2$, and neutrality/monotonicity. Assume there is a non-empty group of people *V* and a pair of alternatives *x* and *y*, such that xP_iy for all *i* in *V* and yP_ix for all *i* not in *V*. Suppose that *xPy*. Then *V* is decisive.

Proof: Let *w* and *z* be any pair of alternatives. Assume wP_iz for all *i* in *V*. We need to show that *wPz* must hold. This follows immediately from neutrality/monotonicity. QED.

Arrow/Pollak Impossibility Theorem 2: Assume $n \geq 2$. The assumptions of complete and transitive social preferences, weak Pareto, neutrality/monotonicity, diverse-2 preferences, and no dictator are mutually inconsistent.

Proof: By the weak Pareto principle, the set of all individuals is decisive. Therefore decisive sets exist. Let *V* be a decisive set of minimal size, that is, a decisive set with no proper subsets that are also decisive. We will show that there is only one person in *V*, which will make that person a dictator. This will establish Arrow's theorem.

Suppose to the contrary that *V* has 2 or more members. By the diverse-2 preferences assumption there is a triple of alternatives *x*, *y*, and *z*, and a partition of *V* into non-empty subsets V_1 and V_2, giving the standard Arrow array as shown

above. Since V is decisive, it must be true that xPy. Next we consider the social preference for x vs. z.

Case 1. Suppose zRx. Then zPy by transitivity. Then V_2 becomes decisive by proposition 2 above. But this is a contradiction, since we assumed that V was a decisive set of minimal size.

Case 2. Suppose *not* zRx. Then the social preference must be xPz, by completeness. But in this case V_1 is getting its way in the face of opposition by everyone else, and by proposition 2 above V_1 is decisive, another contradiction. QED.

Note that theorem 2 can be put in the following way: Assume $n \geq 2$. Assume complete and transitive social preferences, weak Pareto, neutrality/monotonicity, and diverse-2 preferences. Then there is a dictator.

Given our definition of diverse-2 preferences, we have an easy "near converse":

Dictatorship/Diversity Near Converse: Assume $n \geq 2$. Assume there is a dictator. Then the diverse-2 preferences assumption is satisfied.

Proof: If there is a dictator, then there are no minimally sized decisive sets which have 2 or more members. Therefore diverse-2 preferences is vacuously satisfied. QED.

On the other hand, the reader can check to see that the presence of a dictator, by itself, does not imply the other assumptions of theorem 2.

9. Innocuous Dictators.

In the standard multi-profile world, where all preference profiles are allowed (the so-called "universality," or "full domain" assumption) a dictator is a very bad thing indeed. A dictator in such a world forces his (strict) preference for *x* over *y* even if everyone else prefers *y* over *x*. In our single-profile world, on the other hand, a dictator may be innocuous. For instance, if person *i* is indifferent between all pairs of alternatives, he is by definition a dictator, although a completely benign one. Or, if everyone has exactly the same preferences over the alternatives, and weak Pareto is satisfied, then every one is a dictator. Or, if in a committee of 5 people, 3 have identical preferences, and if they use majority rule, then the 3 with identical preferences are all dictators. (Note however that in a standard median voter model, the median voter is not necessarily a dictator. While his favorite alternative may be the choice of the committee, the committee's preferences over all pairs of alternatives will not necessarily agree with his preferences over those pairs of alternatives.)

Therefore we need to make a few comments about why dictatorship should worry us, even though some dictators are innocuous. First, while we assume a single-profile world in this paper, and while for certain given profiles dictatorship doesn't look bad, we must remember that there can be other single-profile worlds with different given preference profiles. So, while in some cases an innocuous dictatorship is acceptable, in many other cases it is very much unacceptable. Second, we could easily get rid of the benign dictator who is indifferent among all alternatives by assuming away individual

indifference. Third, we could reduce the likelihood of other innocuous dictators by strengthening our diversity assumption to the following:

> (5.c) **Diverse-3 preferences**. For any decisive set V with 2 or more members, there exists a triple of alternatives x, y, z, such that xP_iy for all i in V; such that yP_iz and zP_ix for everyone outside of V; and such that V can be partitioned into non-empty subsets V_1 and V_2, where the members of V_1 all put z last in their rankings over the triple, and the members of V_2 all put z first in their rankings over the triple.

This definition of diversity is exactly the same as diverse-2 preferences, except the decisive set V is no longer required to be minimally sized. Obviously diverse-3 preferences is stronger than diverse-2 preferences, but still nowhere near as strong as Pollak diversity; nor does it require near as many distinct alternatives as Pollak diversity. Since diverse-3 preferences implies diverse-2 preferences, proposition 2 and theorem 2 go through with diverse-3 preferences. Our near-converse to theorem 2 of course would no longer hold.

Diverse-3 preferences would exclude vacuous dictatorship cases like the one in which all individuals have exactly the same preferences, or the one in which 3 individuals have identical preferences in a committee of 5, using majority rule.

10. Conclusions.

We have presented two new single-profile Arrow impossibility theorems which are simple and transparent. The first theorem, which requires $n = 2$, relies on a very simple and modest assumption about diversity of preferences within the given preference profile, and on a relatively modest neutrality assumption. The second theorem, which allows $n \geq 2$, uses a substantially more complicated assumption about diversity of preferences within the given profile, which is close to necessary for the result, and uses a stronger neutrality/monotonicity assumption. Both theorems support the claim that Arrow impossibility happens even if individual preferences about alternatives are given and fixed.

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